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'Passing for Normal', 'More Than
Passing Strange' and Other
Strategies: Identity Deconstruction
and Reconstruction among the
"Mentally Ill"
People who belong to marginalized groups
sometimes utilize normalizing statements in
order to contest their marginalization; others who
are "on the edge," contest such normalization,
instead emphasizing their differences. In terms
of individuals with mental illnesses, some
researchers have argued that normalizing
contributes to the creation of a more positive,
personal identity, and can even help change the
boundaries and meanings of illnesses. Others
insist that normalization encourages an
eradication of difference and marginality,
leading to homogeneity. By transforming the
meaning of life at the margins, this contested site
is divested of elements of defiance. Drawing
from the work of medical anthropologists who
have studied individuals with mental illness, this
paper examines how, in a North American
context, individuals with mental illnesses
negotiate among these various strategies.
To begin such an exploration, it is first
necessary to return to conceptualizations of
"normal" and "normalization," which are both
complex and ambiguous. Etymologically,
"norma" means aT-square, and normal is that
which neither bends to the right nor the left, and
it is from this that the two meanings of normal
originate: normal is that which is as it should be,
and normal is that which represents the majority
of cases of a certain kind, or the average. The
obvious ambiguity in the term is that "normal"
refers to a fact and a value attributed to the fact
by virtue of the speaker's evaluative judgment
(Canguilhem 1978:69). Philosopher of science
and historian of medicine, Georges Canguilhem
(1978:23) has pointed out that to define the
abnormal as excess or deficiency is to recognize
the normative character of the "normal." The
normal state is a manifestation of an attachment
to some value:
strictly speaking a norm does not exist,
it plays its role which is to devalue
existence by allowing its correction. To
say that perfect health does not exist is
simply saying that the concept of health
is not one of an existence, but of a norm
whose function and value is to be
brought into contact with existence in
order to stimulate modification
(Canguilhem 1978:37).
Interestingly, the idea of the normal
depends on the possibility of violating the norm,
and the consequent need to "stimulate
modification" is one of the meanings of
"normalization" to which we will return. While it
goes unquestioned by many that what constitutes
"normal" is what constitutes "health,"
Canguilhem (1978:68) describes the historical
development of this idea. Physicians relied
primarily on physiology - "the science of the
normal man" - to identify norms, and restore
functions that deviate from these standards.
Physiological constants are "normal" since they
refer to average characteristics, which are most
frequently observable; however, they are also
"normal" because they are involved in the
normati ve activity of "therapeutics."
Because "health" is both a descriptive
and a normati ve concept, Canguilhem (1978: 77)
is able to state that perfect health on a continual
basis is abnormal since the experience of living
includes disease. Moreover, he deconstructs the
healthy-normalcy equation by explaining that,
"what characterizes health is the possibility of
transcending the norm, which defines the
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momentary normal, the possibility of tolerating
infractions of the habitual norm and instituting
new norms in new situations" (Canguilhem
1978:115). "Healthy," then, is a state in which
one feels "more than normal." Still, as Rose
(1994:67 -8, cited in Lupton 1997: 100) points
out, the linkage between health and the idea of
the "normal" person persists, since medicine,
"has come to link the ethical question of how we
should behave to the scientific question of who
we truly are and what our nature is as human
beings ... as simultaneously unique individuals
and constituents of a population."
While the idea of variation as pathology
has been dominant for several decades (Davis
and Bradley 2000:9), re-examining the concepts,
"norma," "nomos," "anomaly" and "abnormal,"
leads Canguilhem (1978:82) to state not only
that diversity is not disease, but that the
pathological does not signify the absence of a
biological norm; in fact, it is another norm that is
marginalized by life. Indeed, if pathological
phenomena are the modifications of normal
phenomena, the pathological must be
comprehended as one type of normal:
without being absurd, the pathological
state can be called normal to the extent
that it expresses a relationship to life' s
normativity .... this normal could not be
termed identical to the normal
physiological state because we are
dealing with other norms. The abnormal
is not such because of the absence of
normality. There is no life whatsoever
without norms of life, and the morbid
state is always a certain mode of living
(Canguilhem 1978: 137).
The nature of disease, for she who is sick, is
really another way of life: "the pathological state
is not a simple, quantitatively varied extension of
the physiological state, but something else
entirely" (Canguilhem 1978:45). This contrasts
with the dominant theory of the eighteenth
century concerning the relations between the
normal and the pathological, which held that
pathological phenomena were merely
quantitative variations, based on physiological
phenomena. Canguilhem (1978:13) seems to be
arguing for a return to earlier theories of
qualitative conceptualization where the
pathological differed from the normal, as one
quality differs from another (Canguilhem
1978:13).
Those who are diagnosed with "mental
illnesses," then, can be said to be living another
life: "the madman is 'out of his mind' not so
much in relation to other men as to life: he is not
so much deviant as different" (Canguilhem
1978:64). During his discussion of "insanity,"
Canguilhem (1978:66) makes the following
statement that will be variously accepted and
challenged in the discourses of normalization to
which we will turn in the second part of this
paper:
it is the patients who most often decide - and
from very different points of view - whether
they are no longer normal or whether they
have returned to normality. . .. future is
almost always imagined starting from past
experience, becoming normal again means
taking up an interrupted activity or at least an
activity deemed equivalent by individual
tastes or the social values of the milieu.
Canguilhem (1987: 146) explains
normalizing as, "imposing a requirement on an
existence, a given whose variety, disparity, with
regard to the requirement, present themselves as
a hostile, even more than an unknown,
indeterminant." Between 1759 and 1834, the
years that the words "normal" and "normalized"
appeared, respectively, a normative class gained
the ability to identify the function of social
norms, as well as to determine the content
(Canguilhem 1978:151). Canguilhem (1978:69)
asks whether it is because therapeutics aims at
this state as a positive goal to obtain that it is
called "normal," or whether it is because the sick
person considers it "normal" that therapeutics
aim at it.
While he agrees with the latter, a
Foucauldian approach would agree with the
former and problematize the latter. "Philosopher-
historian;' Michel Foucault, (1978:41) focuses
on how therapeutics put into effect mechanisms
of control and surveillance, and explains how the
"norm" assumed greater importance than the
legal system: " ... a power whose task is to take
charge of life needs continuous regulatory and
corrective mechanisms .... it effects distributions
around the norm" (Foucault 1978: 144). Foucault
(1977: 184) also explains how normalization
leads to homogeneity, but it also individualizes
by making it possible to determine levels, and
then make the differences useful by fitting them
together. We are "individualized" so that we can
be better "managed."
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By "normalization," Foucault means a
system of measurable intervals in which people
can be distributed around a norm that both
organizes and is the result of this distribution.
Technologies of normalization fIrst isolate
anomalies, and then normalize them by
corrective or therapeutic procedures, all of which
are purportedly to deal with dangerous deviants;
however, as Foucault shows, the rise of bio-
power occurs at the same time as the appearance
of modem "anomalies," so that "perversions"
seem to be invented in order to be normalized
(Rabinow 1984:21). For example, in Madness
and Civilization (1965), Foucault showed how
conceptions of "sanity" and "insanity" arose in
the eighteenth century as a result of the attempts
of the asylum keepers to manage nonconformist
behavior.
Foucault's early work emphasized
external technologies of domination: "1... tried to
show how we have indirectly constituted
ourselves through the exclusion of some others:
criminals, mad people ... " (Foucault 1988: 146).
His later work on technologies of the self aligns
him, in a certain sense, closer to Canguilhem's
approach to therapeutics and "the normal,"
evident in the question he explores: "How did we
directly constitute our identity through some
ethical techniques of the self which developed
through antiquity down to now?" (Foucault
1988:146). This statement connotes a sense of
individual agency, where, like Canguilhem,
Foucault seems to suggest that because the sick
person considers it "normal," she tries to shape
herself according to this "norm." On the other
hand, it can also refer to Foucault·s notion of
self-surveillance that emerges as a practice of
control.
The concept of "normalization" arose in
Denmark where it referred to the creation of
living conditions for the "mentally retarded" that
are as close to nornlal as possible, a goal that was
set out in the 1959 Mental Retardation Act
(Bank-Mikkelsen 1980:56, cited in Emerson
1992:2). The definition was expanded and
redefined, but continued to emphasize freedom
of choice and right to self-determination; since
equality was defined in terms of having rights to
the same quality of life as non-disabled people,
integration was not necessarily a prerequisite of
equality (Emerson 1992:3). The North American
version of "normalization" was developed by
Wolfensberger (1972:28, cited in Emerson
1992:4) to refer to, "utilization of means which
are as culturally normative as possible, in order
to establish and/or maintain personal behaviors
and characteristics which are as culturally
normative as possible." While the Scandinavian
understandings of normalization focused on the
basic rights of the individual, Wolfensberger's
reformulations stressed changing the social
status of the devalued group as a whole: "the
right not to be segregated and institutionalized
... is really a bigger issue than the restriction of
individual choice" (Wolfensberger 1980:93,
cited in Emerson 1992: 12).
While the emphasis on decent standards
of living has been a positive result of
normalization, the primary contradiction
remains: while normalization tries to revalue
those with disabilities, it is based on a hostility
towards and denial of "differentness" (Szivos
1992:126). The very assumption that to be
valued, disadvantaged groups should attempt to
fulfIll society" s idealized norms must be
questioned (Szivos 1992: 127-8). Moreover,
assimilation or "passing" into the "normal"
culture does not necessarily work, and is not
necessarily a good thing. For example,
normalization stresses paid and meaningful
work, but people with disabilities are often
marginalized at work, and can only earn a
limited amount or they risk losing benefits which
they receive as a result of their being "unfIt to
work." The discussion that follows concerning
work and normalization is also significant in that
Foucault (1965:58,59) has shown how the "great
confinement" of the seventeenth century marked
the time when the "mad" came to be perceived as
those unable to work or integrate into society.
Thus, there was a need to "shut up" the "mad"
and others in order to correct their idleness:
"Hence the Hospital ... will have not only the
aspect of a forced labor camp, but also that of a
moral institution responsible for punishing, for
correcting a certain moral 'abeyance' which does
not merit the tribunal of men, but cannot be
corrected by the severity of penance alone"
(Foucault 1965:59).
Strategies of "Normalization:" To Work or
Not to Work
Many of those I interviewed in 2001, in
the context of my Master's research, were either
unable to work or had great difficulty working,
because of their illnesses, work-related stress,
overmedication and stigmatization. As Ethan, an
artist by profession. explains, the working world
is one of the many spheres in which he is "on the
edge:"
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... work - I have to take it easy,
relationships are a little difficult
because currently I don't fit in the
world. I don't exist in the real world ...
I'm on the edge, I'm on AISH (Assured
Income for the Severely Handicapped),
I'm marginalized, I live in a
marginalized community ... I don't
have a good regular job like everyone
else, I have to live with what I've got.
I don't have a spouse because it's
difficult for me to meet people,
Still, Ethan was also drawn to normalization, and
insisted that,
if I was in a normal state, I'd be
productive. I know painters who are so-
called "normal" and they consistently
paint every day, 8 hours a day ... when
you're depressed, you can't do that. I
wonder what Van Gogh would be like if
he was not bipolar ... if he was normal
maybe he would have cranked out twice
as much and maybe it would have been
just as good.
Ethan's statements clearly show the pattern of
oscillation between recognition of differences
and desire for normalcy that Becker (1997: 16)
encountered in narratives of people with
"disrupted lives."
Similarly, Tom's comments constitute a
"doubled discourse" (Rapp 2000:202) of
acceptance of difference and working toward
normalization. Reflecting on schizophrenia, he
said, "I don't know if you're born with it or not,
and if you are, I think it's just an unnurtured gift
that's out of control ... maybe we do produce too
much of one chemical but maybe that's meant to
be for things to come to pass what are supposed
to in certain peoples' lives." On the other hand,
Tom insisted that the medications really work as
they keep him balanced, so that he does not, "go
from one extreme to the other;" and he offered
the following desire for the future treatment of
individuals with schizophrenia: "hopefully, a few
generations down the line, we can teach them
how to grow up to make 'em feel more normal or
train them differently so they can excel more
better."
While Canguilhem suggested that
patients decide when they have returned to
normality, Ethan's next statement complicates
the issue:
most of us forget what the hell normal
is. I think it's all contextual based on
the day ... the problem for a lot of
people is that you get put on mood
stabilizers and that definitely does not
put you to normal. If you're not on it
you're not normal, if you're over-
medicated you're not normal, if you're
under-medicated you're not normal, if
you're having a shitty month you're not
normal. It's hard to determine what a
normal state of being is. What was
normal for me when I was twenty-five
years old is not normal now. What's
normal now changes all the time.
Becker (1997 :200) notes that qualifying the
meaning of normal, as Ethan does with the
phrase, "normal for me," is part of the struggle to
come to terms with discourses on normalcy
through reshaping one's own idea of the
"normal." Lam's reflections on normalcy also
complicate Canguilhem' s assumption: "I still
haven't figured out what normal is ... my
therapist said, 'things are pretty normal in your
life.' I said, 'Last month you wanted to talk to
my psychiatrist. How can you detect when
things are normal?' And he couldn't answer that
- normal is iffy." Tyler explained that he's
"trying to stay as sane as I possibly can, which is
what everyone's trying to do." He described it
as, "walking the edge of this table - I don't know
whether I'll fall off it or go over here and be
really sane or normal, whatever normal or sane
is."
While neither Ethan nor Tyler were
working at the time of the interviews, and Lam
was working only part-time, a number of
participants felt that being able to work helped
them cope with their illnesses. Carolyn explained
that despite her schizophrenia, she is, "really
working towards having as normal of a brain as
possible and making the illness as small of a
problem as possible." She also commented on
how her normalization has been received by her
family: "now that I am treated and going to
school and working and leading a normal life,
they are very happy and relieved." Tina, who
was diagnosed with bipolar affective disorder,
also used normalizing discourse, insisting that,
"the medications work; I would say I'm almost
back to my normal self." Similarly, Marilyn,
who had a diagnosis of schizophrenia, explained
that she went through a period during her illness
when she realized, "my life was never going to
be normal again. Now, thank God to newer
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medications, I'm back circulating in what I
consider normalcy ... but it took, like, thirteen
years." These normalizing statements, in contrast
to those of Ethan and Lam, lend support to
Canguilhem's statement that patients decide
when they have returned to normality.
Kirsh (2000:4) explains that many
people with mental illnesses who advocate for
fuller integration into mainstream society push
for total community participation, and view work
in terms of "citizenship behaviors" that add to
community life, as well as self-advancement.
"Consumers," in her research, viewed work as
something that moved one's focus from
differences between those with mental disorders
and others to similarities; as Susan stated, "there,
I'm a worker who does a good job, gets paid and
earns a living like anybody else. I'm almost
normal." Many of the consumers in Kirsh's
(2000: 10) study who worked, "described
improved mental health and self-esteem and a
more integrated, 'normalized' way of life."
These individuals agree, on a certain level, with
"normalization," and see themselves not as
normal, but in the process of being normalized.
In contrast, Estroff (1981:132) found
that about 75% of the clients registered in
P.A.C.T. (Program for Assertive Community
Treatment) were constantly unemployed, despite
the normalization philosophy of this program,
which heavily emphasized finding and
maintaining employment. The findings are
partially a result of the fact that some clients
defined work differently; for example, George's
"work" involved attending religious services and
classes and organizing a public ministry, while
Sadie eschewed "work," preferring to talk with
people and wonder about the nature of existence
(Estroff 1981: 141). Still others lacked any
motivation to work, which can be attributed to
their predictions that they would get fired or end
up quitting, their refusal to accept menial work,
or the fact that they could rely on financial
assistance (Estroff 1981: 142). There was also a
disinterest in conventional employment for
reasons such as restrictions of symptoms, and the
feeling that all one's energies were needed just to
make it through the day. For example, Morris
told staff, ''I'm a little too mentally ill to go to
work today" (Estroff 1981:141).
"Making It Crazy"
This statement also points to the fact
that while some clients reject the
"normalization" mandate to take up conventional
work (or any work, for that matter), there is a
certain acceptance of the "dividing practices"
that have led to them being labeled them
"mentally ill." This is also evident in Estroff's
research in clients' distinction between
themselves - "Crazies" - and others
"Normies." Similarly, Harold said that he didn't
believe he was really crazy, but that "the only
time I ever do think I am is when I can't believe
some of the things I pull to get into the hospital. I
guess I just feel like I belong, or it' s more secure,
or something" (Estroff 1981:231). Estroff
(1981:237) suggests that when people express a
lack of intersubjective reality with others, they
must accept this "different" reality, and when
this reality is threatened, by techniques of
psychiatric normalization, for example, they may
react by defending the "crazy self." Moreover,
Estroff (1981 :244) maintains that we are all
complicit in "making it crazy," a process in
which, "long-term psychiatric patients are
entwined in the paradoxes of constructing and
living with a crazy identity and with uncertain
illness in a sociocultural environment that
communicates and denies, enhances and
devalues who they are and how they are."
The rewards of normalcy, from the
point of view of those who feel and act
differently, may pale in comparison to the
"advantages" of accepting the "crazy" identity.
However, by grasping the crazy identity and
thus, maintaining control over their identities,
they are marginalized socially. These findings
lend support to Ong's (1995:1244) critique of
Foucault's analysis of how individual bodies and
the social body are adjusted to normalizing
standards: "he barely explores how the subjects
of regulation themselves draw the medical gaze
in the first place. nor how their resistances to
biomedical intervention both invite and deflect
control."
The attitudes of P.A.C.T. clients
involved in "making it crazy" differ greatly from
members of another P.A.c.T. organization,
whose acronym stands for People Against
Coercive Treatment. These "psychiatric
survivors" came together to try to stop changes
to the Mental Health Act that would allow forced
psychiatric treatment in the conununity. Their
mission statement, which shakes an accusatory
fist at the Ontario government, psychiatrists, and
pharmaceutical companies, makes clear their
stand of resistance to and rejection of
normalization:
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after all, if they can drug enough hurting,
vulnerable, desperate people to make them
forget why they are hurting so badly, if they
can sweep the homeless into prisons and
institutions to keep them out of sight and out
of mind, then maybe they can pretend that
they are responding to public concern as they
line the pockets of rich doctors and drug
manufacturers ... we are ... punished for
being what we are, told we're insane because
we don't conform, beaten into submission
both physically and mentally .... WE DON'T
HAVE 'BROKEN BRAINS,' WE HAVE
SHATTERED SOULS.
While the position of these "psychiatric
survivors" is certainly a rejection of
normalization as I have been discussing this
concept, Estroff (1991 :337) highlights a different
strategy of "normalizing," which aims at
recategorizing either the individual as non-
pathological, or the disorder as one that occurs
commonly in others. The excerpt from
P.A.C.T.'s mission statement corresponds with
the former strategy, while the following
statement made to Estroff (1991:331) represents
the latter: "I think everybody's got a little mental
illness. Ifs just some know and some don't"
(Estroff 1991 :331). Many of the participants in
Estroff s study spoke of how emotional problems
are not mental illnesses, because everybody has
to deal with stress every day.
Similarly, Schneider (forthcoming)
notes that participants diagnosed with
schizophrenia use similar normalizing strategies.
For example, Marie explains her delusions
during the exam period: "I just see it as a natural
process of having stress in accordance to
schizophrenia .... other people have stress in other
forms. Because I have these unique perceptual
experiences, I experience the stress in a different
form." One of the participants in my research
offered this expanded version of "everybody's
got a little mental illness:"
I personally think everybody has bipolar
illness: some are in the middle with
their chemistry, some definitely get
blue, short term, some get happier than
others. But in our case, we're more
bipolar Is or 2s or 3s, which is just a
different range of it. But I think we're
just a bag of water and chemistry, eh ...
thaf s what we are - chemicals, and I
think if s within the human range. And
I think we've been given labels to all
these things ...
For the larger society, "schizophrenia"
and "mental illness" hold few meanings
understood as "normal" or positive, yet these
individuals assert the "normalness" of this
category. A Foucauldian perspective might
critique such strategies of normalization, arguing
that they continue to act as mechanisms of
control that homogenize society and deny
differences. However, Schneider (forthcoming)
points out that not only does such normalizing
talk help individuals to create a more positive
personal identity, but it also contributes to the
definition and re-definition of the boundaries and
meanings of the very categories of mental
disorders. These findings lend support to
Lupton's (1997:94-5) critique of those using a
Foucauldian framework, who tend, "to neglect
examination of the ways that hegemonic medical
discourses and practices are variously taken up,
negotiated or transformed by members of the lay
population in their quest to maximize their health
status ... "
Resisting "Normalization"
To define the normal in terms of
adaptability and fitness means that attention must
be paid to the question of to what and for what
we determine adaptability. Canguilhem
(1978: 176) noted that defining abnormality in
relation to social maladaptation requires an
acceptance that the individual must subscribe to
such a society, and must accommodate herself to
it as a reality which is also a good one. Foucault
(1982:216) takes this line of thought further,
suggesting that "maybe the target nowadays is
not to discover what we are, but to refuse what
we are . .,We have to promote new forms of
subjectivity through refusal of this kind of
individuality which has been imposed on us ... ."
Such an effort to "refuse what we are" can be
seen in the various strategies by which
individuals reject the normalization mandate. An
explicit example is provided on the website for
"The Mental Illness Education Project, Inc." in
the following excerpt from an article by Patricia
Deegan (1996):
The goal of recovery is not to get
mainstreamed. We don't want to be
mainstreamed. We say let the mainstream
become a wide stream that has room for all of
us and leaves no one stranded on the fringes.
The goal of the recovery process is not to
become normal. The goal is to embrace our
human vocation of becoming more deeply,
T< )"! ,._,"'" j'::': ..::::y,:> :..;)" i'
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more fully human. The goal is not
normalization. ... one of the most essential
challenges that faces us is to ask, who can I
become ... ?
A minority of the partICIpants in my
research subscribed to this anti-normalization
mandate, offering alternative understandings of
their diagnosed conditions. For example,
Alexander, a screen-play writer, insists that
bipolar affective disorder enables him to create:
for someone like me, someone who is
thinking I'm an artist, that's kind of, I don't
know, maybe it sounds strange, but it's kind
of good, because it's special. Only I% of the
population have this disease, And lots of
wliters and composers have same disease,
That means maybe I could be .. .I don't think
ordinary people can feel this colour and this
light and these crazy things in my brain, It
could be really good for creative work ... .I
got something from something, so I have to
use this ability. So I think this is ability. It's
a good thing.
Another partICIpant diagnosed with bipolar
affective disorder stated: "I keep looking for
these Goliaths that I want to be David to ", I
think I've created for myself existential despair
or existential problems." Jenny went on to speak
of how existential despair is part of a search for
meaning, and interpreted her disorder within this
framework; she would likely agree with the point
made by Shorto (1999:15) that, "by looking at
psychosis as a mere illness , .. psychiatry misses
the whole point of the affliction: that it is
ultimately an attempt to find deeper meaning."
When I asked how the medical
professionals had explained the disorder, Jenny
said, "the doctors explained ... nerves in the
brain and all that jazz - I'm too stubborn to settle
for burying the stuff under the pile of drugs.
Maybe it's just not possible to sort out your
existential despair - you'd have to change the
world too much." Jenny" s comments reflect
Karp's (1996:178, cited in Fee 2000:90)
statement that as our society becomes more and
more medicalized, a "culturally induced
readiness to interpret pain as illness," is evident.
During the group interview, which took place
two days after the terrorist attacks of September
11th, Jenny insisted that, "if you have a disorder
and the norm is the other kind of people ", I
personally believe that the society is just as crazy
as I am, and the last couple days has been proof
of that!" This statement is an apt illustration of
Gottschalk's (2000:22) point that explaining
mental disorders as individual problems, rather
than critically assessing the sociocultural
environment, supports the idea that the existing
social order is sane, and "normal" (conforming)
social/psychological dispositions are healthy.
Social forces, then, may be pushing us into a
"normal madness."
Dee, a participant diagnosed with
schizophrenia, noted that among native groups,
"people like me would become medicine men,"
Instead, she says, "the white man's still torturing
their spiritual leaders, " and added the following
about the way mental illnesses are approached in
our society, or rather, the way they are not
approached:
I don't know whether they're so right in
taking mental illness and sort of
chopping it all up and puttin' it in these
categories and labels. And I wonder if
there's a lot more there that they don't
understand; that really we're going
backward in time when we should be
going forward ...
Later Dee reflected Jenny's beliefs about the
cause of her disorder being partially rooted
outside of herself, in society: "from my own
personal point of view, a lot that contributes to
the unbalance is stress in the society , ..
perpetuates the illness. "
Questioning the meaning of the voices
that those diagnosed with schizophrenia hear,
Dee wonders if they are picking up voices from
minds: "there's a lot more happening than it
being just an illness ", may be part of a sixth
sense that's not developed in a nurturing
environment.,.it will come to light that it's a
very valuable part of the evolution of
humankind." While mental disorders may not
be "normal," then, they are not something to be
devalued as "illnesses" and "normalized." Dee's
words and her later comment that her mental
disorder has made her more aware of the fact that
all of us are connected, reflect the beliefs of
proponents of the psyche-spirit movement and
consciousness studies, who reject traditional
understandings of what human beings are, how
we know and what knowledge is composed of;
along with Dee, they "assume that individual
consciousness is broader, weirder, fuzzier than
we normally allow, that it somehow or other
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extends beyond the skin of the individual
person" (Shorto 1999:225).
During a group interview, Lyle
explained the essence of psychiatry: "your
mind's gone wrong, or something, in somebody's
eyes." His challenge to the authority of
normalcy is strikingly evident in his description
of how individuals with mental illness are
treated, which evokes Canguilhem' s statement
concerning "stimulating modification" as well as
Foucault's discussion of technologies of
normalization that impose homogeneity:
I believe I have been enriched by my
illness because I think I've had a wider
expression of emotion because of it ...
but people around me don't necessarily
want that or allow that so they medicate
you or hospitalize you because they
can't cope, it isn't within their realm.
And so, in order for you to fit the norm
of what everybody else wants, you're
hospitalized and it's taken away from
you and then the medication makes you
like a zombie. How can that be better?
So in a way, I feel it's very progressive,
it's very creative, it's very advanced
and I think you can relate in a different
way to things because of it ... you could
say it's a gift ...
All of these anti-normalizing statements reflect
Estroffs (1981:215) caution that we need to
avoid ethnocentricity in assuming that
"normalcy" is equally attractive to people,
particularly to people who receive signs that they
are different.
Another Way of Life
These narratives also support
Canguilhem's (1978:64) contention that disease
is really another way of life; those diagnosed
with mental illnesses are living another life, and
are therefore different, rather than deviant.
Another example of this qualitative difference is
the "particular form of being-in-the-world" of
people with schizophrenia that Corin (1990: 171)
encountered in a Montreal hospital. While
"social deinstitutionalization" or "community
integration" is often assumed to have a
normalizing effect, Corin (1990: 170) found that,
"the ability to remain within society is not
associated with resuming a 'normal' well
integrated position." Rather, those who avoided
rehospitalization adopted a personal stance of
"detachment" toward the outside world, which
was manifested in "symptoms" of "emotional
withdrawal," "poor rapport," etc. While such
"symptoms" are traditionally linked to poor
outcome, Corin (1990: 170) reconceptualizes
them as "positive withdrawal," as they are
associated with the ability to remain within the
community.
The critique offered in her conclusion is
useful to keep in mind when we consider the
constraints on individuals' strategies of
conforming to or resisting normalization.
Strategies of relating to the world by those with
schizophrenia are fragile, which, in contrast to
therapeutic possession rituals in some cultures,
"reflects the absence of cultural processes
allowing people to go back and forth between
marginal and normal positions ... differences
remain trapped at the periphery and that would
qualify a withdrawal process with irreversibility"
(Corin 1990:184). While "integrated" on a
superficial level, the participants in her research
remain "on the edge."
Most participants who explicitly reject
"normalization" would likely agree with a
"recovery" model that is based on valuing those
who are different, and not just those who "fit in"
by "passing as normal:" "one can be 'disabled'
and positively different - exactly as one can be
'mad and proud' (Sayce 2000: 132-3). This
statement, however, needs careful consideration
in light of Dumont's (1983:260, cited in Corin
1990: 183) insistence that, "if the advocates for
the difference call together for it equality and
recognition, they call for the impossible."
Dumont is referring to the ambiguous nature of
"individuality," which signals simultaneously the
promotion of self-realization and a uniform
notion of what individuals should be; hence,
"individuality," "atomization," "identity" and
"equality" are closely connected, resulting in the
subordination of differences (Corin 1990: 183).
Corin (1990:183) points out that while a tolerant
attitude would acknowledge differences and
accept or transcend them, the attitude of North
Americans toward marginality is really
"indifference," which sees differences as of little
value. She highlights the importance of
normalization philosophy in rehabilitation as an
example of how differences are negated.
On the other hand, as Becker
(1997:202) found in her research in the United
States with people who have various disabilities,
resistance to normalizing ideologies can be
creative and transformative. This is also evident
in some of the narratives given by my research
participants. An interesting example of the
transformative potential of resistance to
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"normalization" is the Hearing Voices Network,
which encourages people to redefine their
experience in ways which reject the role of
victimized patient (Romme and Escherr, 1993,
cited in Burr and Butt 2000:203). This
specialized self-help group network was initiated
by Dutch psychiatrist, Dr. Marius Romme, when
he discovered that many voice-hearers were
living successfully in society. The basis for this
movement in the UK is that psychiatric
medications do not work in the long term, while
learning to accept and live with hearing voices
has met with success. While there are no
branches of this network in North America yet, it
appears likely that the success of this movement
will lead to its development here as well,
particularly as there are a number of psychiatric
survivor groups, whose members draw upon
anti-psychiatry literature to reformulate their
conditions and resist normalizing ideologies.
Groups like the Voice Hearers Network,
as well as individuals who are shifting the
boundaries of normalcy, or rejecting them
altogether, provide a powerful counterpoint to
statements such as the following: "the
specification of 'normality" has become narrower
and more stringent - it is easier to fall outside of
the specifications where the penalties are harsh
(institutionalization) ... to qualify as a 'normal'
person one must torture oneself in relation to
strict and constricting criteria" (Eckermann
1997:158). While there may be some truth in this
statement, it is misleading when we consider the
various strategies implemented by those
diagnosed with mental illnesses.
Interestingly, the Voice Hearers
Network rejects normalization in that it does not
attempt to "make normal," those who hear
voices; however, it constitutes a normalizing
rationale, in that it makes "normal" the
phenomena of voice hearing. It was through a
radio appeal, that Romme established that
hearing voices was actually a widespread
experience, but only problematic for a minority
(Clarke 2001: 12). Referring to the Hearing
Voices Network, Clarke (2001:12) notes that "a
normalizing rationale is a powerful tool in
building the therapeutic alliance In
... psychosis, the normalizing rationale adds to
this a way of making sense of the client's
predicament which offers less stigmatization and
more hope of control than the traditional one."
This statement underlines what should be clear
by now: any simplistic assessment of
"normalizing" as being negative (or positive) or
rejection of "normalizing" as being positive (or
negative) cannot be made.
Multiplicity of Strategies and Doubled
Discourses
It is imperative that we do not fall into
the trap of declaring normalizing discourses the
dominant discourse and resistance to
normalization the subjugated knowledge, and
then attaching value to one or the other in a
polarized fashion. The diverse strategies used by
those diagnosed with mental illnesses foreclose
such a myopic judgment. As Foucault
(1978: 100) put it, "we must not imagine a world
of discourse divided between accepted discourse
and excluded discourse, or between the dominant
discourse and the dominated one; but as a
multiplicity of discursive elements that can come
into play in various strategies."
Goffman (1963:138) stated that, "the
normal and the stigmatized are not persons but
rather perspectives." It seems clear that
discourses of normalization and resistance to
normalization are as various as the unique
individuals and their perspectives. I have
discussed those who use normalizing talk to
makes claims of being "inside" the realm of
"normalcy," rather than "on the edge." A number
of those diagnosed with mental illnesses utilized
a doubled discourse of accepting difference but
working towards normalization. Others rejected
the normalization mandate, but accepted the
dividing practices that led them to be "mad and
proud." Those who claimed to have "shattered
souls" resisted both normalization and the
dividing practices that labeled them "mad."
However, the complexity of concepts of
"normal" and "normalization," is evident in the
fact that these P.A.C.T. members also subscribe
to a normalizing rationale in their
recategorization of themselves as non-
pathological. Similarly, the Voice Hearer"s
Network represents a rejection of normalization
through the rejection of the connection between
hearing voices and "illness;" however, it is
normalizing in that it makes normal the
phenomenon of hearing voices. Other
normalizing strategies used included the
recategorization of mental illness as occurring
commonly among others, and emphasizing the
"normal" aspects of the disorder. Resistance to
normalization was evident in participants who
understood their "disorders" as "progressive,"
"ability," "good for creative work," or "a gift."
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In regard to normalization, Estroff
(1991:363) issues the following caution:
"perhaps chronicity and disability begin when
normalizing talk ends, or when the individual
thinks that no one else is listening. One
compelling challenge for anthropologists and
clinicians alike is to keep the conversation
going." Similarly, promoting a movement
towards reduced social exclusion of people with
mental illnesses, Sayce (2000:36) suggests that
we need to start by listening to what those "on
the edge" are trying to tell us. While I agree with
Estroff and Sayce that we need to listen to those
who are "on the edge," I am not sure that
keeping the conversation of normalizing going,
or decreasing "social exclusion" should be our
primary goals in every instance. Is it worth it,
after all, if social inclusion requires
homogenization: "Does assimilation to the
dominant center represent resilience or self-
negation? what healthy outcomes can
realistically be expected, and at what cost for the
marginalized?'" (Ha11l999:98).
In reference to homelessness and mental
illness in New York City, Hopper (1988:165)
suggests that the assumption that mental
disorders are responsible for homelessness has
the effect of, "transforming the meaning of life at
the margins, leaching it of any residual elements
of refusal or defiance." The question of whether
there is value in "life at the margins" that will be
lost with "social inclusion" must be considered.
The transformation of the meaning of life "on the
edge" should be effected, as much as possible,
by those who occupy this margin. Another
question to consider is raised by Hall (1999:90):
"Can one be marginalized, yet not oppressed?"
She also asks whether those who we have been
discussing as "on the edge," or marginalized, are
actually exteriorized - outside of the system. Are
people labeled "schizophrenic" considered
"persons" in our society? (Hall 1999:96).
Looking toward the future. the Director
of the National Institute of Mental Health in the
United States has made the following statement:
By 2020 it will be a truth, obvious to all, that
mental illnesses are brain diseases that result
from complex gene-environment interactions.
We will be reaping the therapeutic benefits
that accrue from the discovery of risk genes
for schizophrenia, manic depressive
illness and other serious mental disorders.
We will also routinely analyze real-time
movies of brain activity ... we will see the
activity of distributed neural circuits during
diverse example of normal cognition and
emotion; we will see how things go wrong in
mental illness; and we will see normalization
with our improved treatments (Hyman cited
in Goldsmith 1999:2293).
Such a prediction leads to the possibility that
more support groups will appear for parents of
those individuals unfortunate enough to be born
with such "risk genes" and possibly even support
groups for the children themselves; such a
construction of collective identity by way of
emergent categories of biomedicine has been
termed "biosociality" by Rabinow (1992:58).
However, even if this notion of the origin of
mental illnesses does become "obvious to all,"
and "risk genes" and improved treatments are
discovered, as this paper has shown,
"normalization" is not a certainty. Some will try
to "pass for normal," while others will remain
"more than passing strange," while others will
engage in the myriad of complex, and often
contradictory strategies of normalization and
anti-normalization, of which this paper offers but
a glimpse.
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